According to the Diary of the 102nd Field Ambulance, July 1st 1916
was clear, bright and warm.
The 34th Division, positioned between the 8th on its left and 21st
on its right, with the 19th Division in reserve, was allotted the
task of capturing the village of La Boiselle and the region to the
east. The 101st and 102nd Brigades, with the 101st on the left, were
to carry out the initial attacks, with the 103rd in support. Orders
issued to the 3rd Battalion Tyneside Scottish show that the 1st
Battalion, supported by the 2nd, would attack from the north end of
the Brigade's trenches, along Mash Valley, and the 4th, supported by
the 3rd, would attack from the south, along Sausage Valley. Both
pairs of Battalions were expected to advance to positions some 1200
to 1500 yards behind the German front lines. This was a change from
the original plan, as 102nd Brigade Operations Order No.32, of 19th
June 1916 indicated that the 2nd Battalion would move forward
followed by the 3rd, and the 1st followed by the 4th.
A British 9.2 inch gun
The two huge mines, one under the German front line in Mash
Valley, the other in Sausage Valley, exploded at 7.28 am, two minutes
before the attack was due to commence. The mine in Mash Valley
consisted of 20 tons of ammonal, the other, whose effects can still
be seen as the Lochnager Crater south of La Boiselle, contained 30
tons of the explosive. The 4th and 1st battalions immediately began
their advance, the 2nd and 3rd waiting two minutes for the debris of
the larger explosion to clear. The men advanced as they had been
ordered, in four columns consisting of platoons from each Company.
The men were two paces apart, and the next line was 150 yards behind.
All four Battalions of the Tyneside Scottish were led over the top by
their pipers, proudly playing the instruments which had so generously
been provided by donations from people back on Tyneside. Each man was
expected to be carrying his rifle and equipment, except for the main
pack; 2 bandoliers of Small Arms Ammunition as well as his own
equipment ammunition, making 220 rounds in all; 2 Mills grenades; 1
iron ration and other rations fro the day of the assault; a
waterproof cape; 4 sandbags (presumably unfilled); 2 smoke helmets
and picor goggles in case of gas attack. Haversacks were to be
carried on the back. As many men as possible were to carry wire
cutters, and picks and shovels were to be distributed evenly among
the soldiers. In addition, men in the second waves also carried reels
of telephone cable, signalling equipment and other impedimenta. Many
were so loaded down they could hardly walk. All men of the Brigade
were to wear a distinguishing mark on their backs in the form of a
yellow triangle with 16 inch sides, base uppermost. Packs greatcoats
and waterproofs sheets were not to be carried into the attack, but
were to be labelled with rank, name, initials, number, regiment and
brigade. These articles were all to be stored in Albert.
Ready to Attack
The men were reminded that iron rations were only to be eaten with
definite orders from an officer. The officers were instructed to
ensure that only one ration per three men was opened at first,
although more could be opened at the commanding officer's discretion.
The number of iron rations used was to be reported at the first
opportunity to Brigade Headquarters. All ranks were warned that on no
account must food be eaten or water drank which was found in the
enemy's lines until after it had been declared uncontaminated by
Medical Officers. At least one enterprising officer of 34th Division
took matters further than these orders suggested. A certain Colonel
Rose was a water diviner, and managed to locate the position of water
supplies at comparatively shallow depths, a great help as most of the
wells in the area had been filled in or were foul. The Army Service
Corps dug wells or made borings in places indicated, and so greatly
relieved the problems of water shortage.
The intention was that, as the men advanced, they would be
preceded by a 'creeping barrage' of artillery fire, planned to move
forward at a steady pace, thus ensuring that the enemy would remain
under cover until the infantry were almost upon them. To make sure
that the artillery did not fire on its own troops, the leading waves
were to light flares at 15 second intervals to show where the front
line was. As men moved past these, they were to be stamped out. The
creeping barrage was, in the event, an almost total failure for a
number of reasons. The depth and protection of the German dugouts had
not been realised, and most of the men in the enemy's front lines
were unaffected by the bombardment. The creeping barrage was worked
out so precisely that it was almost impossible to alter whilst in
operation, and it rapidly moved well ahead of the advancing troops.
Also, as one ex-officer wrote in 1930, in a letter to
Brigadier-General Edmonds, the compiler of the official History of
the war, "...the barrage of 3rd Corps front was made to jump from one
trench system to the next. We did not realise the Germans would be
driven out of their trenches and would occupy their shell holes with
machine guns and riflemen. It was this defence, combined with the
concrete machine gun emplacements, especially round Ovillers, that
caused the trouble on the first day owing mainly to the fact that the
barrage jumped from one trench to another and did not touch the shell
holes. The second point was that we did not in the least realise how
slowly attacking troops must move in fighting of this description."
The Tyneside Irish advancing towards Ovillers
The concrete machine gun emplacements alluded to in the letter had
been unobserved by the British, and no artillery had attempted to
destroy them. They were carefully concealed and had not been used by
the Germans during the build-up to the Battle. Those around Ovillers
covered most of Sausage valley, and probably accounted for many of
the casualties in the 4th Tyneside Scottish, and also the Tyneside
Irish. As soon as the men climbed out of their trenches the
unobserved German machine guns opened up with a withering enfilade
fire mowing down the advancing soldiers before most had moved more
than a few yards. In the case of units such as the 3rd Tyneside
Scottish, many did not even make the front line of British trenches
before being hit; those who had moved off from the front line of
trenches hardly started crossing No-Man's Land. To support the
machine guns, the Germans quickly re-aligned their artillery to
bombard the advancing troops, adding to the carnage. Private James A
Brown was one of those wounded. Despite the rising casualties, the
advance pushed slowly forward, and a few men from each Battalion
reached the first line of enemy trenches, mostly to be killed or
pushed back. All four Battalions lost their Commanding Officers in
No-Man's Land, including Lt. Col Elphingstone, who had commanded the
3rd Battalion since its formation. Other units
were encountering problems of their own. The 18th Northumberland
Fusiliers, the Tyneside Pioneers, were in the region of Becourt Wood
when the advance began, with orders to move supplies forward to keep
up with the advance. This was found to be almost impossible due to
the congestion in the forward trenches caused crowds of returning
wounded. Several of the unit's men were themselves wounded by
shrapnel, and at least one officer was killed when he climbed out of
a trench in order to try and find a way through.
One company was detailed to dig a communication trench across
No-Man's Land, but found this impossible. A shallow gallery had been
occupied the night before, but when men under Lt. Nixon tried to open
the end of this as a line of communication they found 12 feet of
earth above them instead of the two they had been led to expect. The
platoon started digging at midnight and eventually broke through
sufficiently to allow cables to be passed through by 8.30 a.m. A
communication trench eventually reached the enemy front line at 7
p.m.
208 Field Company Royal Engineers was attached to 3rd and 4th
Tyneside Scottish with orders to move forward immediately behind the
advancing infantry and begin constructing strongpoints. In the event,
the heavy artillery and machine gun fire meant they did not even get
into No-Man's Land, suffering several casualties. The 102nd Machine
Gun Company moved forward with the initial advance, but immediately
began suffering casualties, mostly by machine gun bullets in the
legs. Several officers were wounded, and the company lost 3 of its 16
guns. Men and guns were frequently buried under earth and debris, but
each time managed to dig themselves out and continue firing.
The farthest advance on the 102nd Brigade front was made by a
small group of men from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions who managed to
reach the third line of German trenches but were forced back by heavy
enemy fire. Major Acklom, now acting Commanding Officer, had gathered
these together by 8 a.m., a total of 7 officers and 200 men, at that
time the total effective strength of some 2,000 men who had climbed
out of the trenches some 30 minutes earlier. The 1st and 4th
Battalions had suffered similar casualties. In half an hour the
Tyneside Scottish Brigade had virtually ceased to exist.The small
force under Major Acklom managed to hold a section of enemy trench,
between the larger mine crater and the village, along with part of
the tunnel which had been dug when the mine was prepared.
Between 8 a.m. and 12.45 p.m. the small group of men managed to
repel six attacks on their exposed flanks. Captain Fortune,
commanding 'D' Company of the Tyneside Pioneers, along with 2 Lt.
Dodds, took a party laden with bombs directly to the crater at 1 p.m.
(Lt. Dodds continued supplying the men in the crater until they were
withdrawn on the evening of July 3rd.) Another group from the
Pioneers also supplied the crater with water, rations and small arms
ammunition.
A group of men from the Lincolns, under 2nd Lieutenant Turnbull,
had established themselves in a crater about 100 yards south of the
Tyneside Scottish position, in an area referred to as Scots Redoubt,
and contact was made with these in the afternoon, so strengthening
the position somewhat.
Despite the enormous number of casualties on the battlefield,
102nd Field Ambulance had a comparatively quiet day, due no doubt to
the difficulties which were being experienced in removing wounded
from the trenches. They were, however, ordered to despatch motor
ambulances to 103rd Field Ambulance at Moulin Vivier (they sent 2
Talbots), and 104th Field Ambulance at Dernancourt (2 Talbots and 1
Ford were sent). At 6 p.m. the officer commanding visited Dernancourt
and on his return transferred two horse-drawn ambulances and two
General Service wagons to their assistance, along with Lt. G.M.
Thomas and ten 'temporary unfit' patients.
Very little happened for the rest of the day, and after dark the
group managed to make contact with other troops who were holding the
crater left by the mine. 4th Army Headquarters were more or less
unaware of the situation for several hours. The Summary of Operations
record has an entry timed at 10.11 a.m. which states "102nd Bde.
reports that Brigade signalling officer was in Boiselle and it
appears to be clear of enemy. Possibly a few still remain in dugouts
on east side." This report undoubtedly stems from an incident related
by Ternan in his book about the Tyneside Scottish. Lt. Dowse, the
102nd Brigade's signalling officer, had orders to lay telephone lines
as soon as La Boiselle had been captured, ready for the move there by
Brigade headquarters. In fact, he moved off as soon as he saw British
troops in the German front trenches. With two orderlies he walked
along the Bapaume road and into the village, which was more or less
empty. Realising his mistake, he removed as much equipment as
possible from a German dugout, and proceeded back along the road. One
of the orderlies was, unfortunately, killed. As a commentator after
the war pointed out, if the plans had been more flexible, and
communications between front lines and headquarters better, La
Boiselle could probably have been captured on the first morning with
considerably fewer casualties.
At 3.10 p.m. there was an unconfirmed report from 34th Division
that its right flank was consolidating in Contalmaison. This report
probably arose from the action of a group of some 30 men of the
Tyneside Irish, led by a junior officer, who had not received the
order to cease advancing, and had decided to press on to their first
objective. Having advanced 4,000 yards from their start point, and
now being 2,000 yards inside the German lines, they had advanced
farther than any other British troops on the first day. Unfortunately
they were overwhelmed by the enemy and wiped out.By early evening 4th
Army HQ began to appreciate the situation, and ordered an attack on
La Boiselle by 19th Division, timed to start at 10.30 p.m. Similar
things were happening all along the British front. At the end of the
first day, General Rawlinson was given a casualty figure of 16,000,
but it was not until the 1920's that the full numbers were
calculated. It would appear that 57,470 men, half the attacking
force, were killed, wounded or captured. 30,000 had been lost in the
first hour. Kitchener's New Army, which had taken two years to
create, was destroyed in twelve hours, 30,419 of the volunteers being
casualties. On the other side, the Germans lost some 8,000 men,
although this was to rise later. The only real success was made on
the right of 4th Army, where the 30th, 18th and 7th Divisions
attacked alongside the French. These Divisions were mainly Regular
Army, and the troops and their leaders were experienced and flexible
enough to alter their plans to suit the situation, for example
halting the initial attack to allow a re-bombardment and for fresh
troops to take over the lead.
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